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is of course a controversial claim, at least as applied to Aquinas, but 1 believe 
YearJey is correct.) Hence, if we are to identify significant similarities be-
tween the theories of Mencius and Aquinas, we will be most likely to be 
successful when comparing their practical theories of human flourishing and 
its corresponding virtues. And Yearley argues that this is indeed the case. 
Although they are clearly dissimilar in many ways, Mencius' and Aquinas' 
accounts of the virtues, analyzed along the lines suggested by Aquinas' ana-
logical theory of virtue, reveal unexpected and illuminating similarities. For 
example, while the notion of dispositions is more congenial to Aquinas' 
theory than to Mencius', it nonetheless serves to illuminate a range of notions 
in the latter; in turn, Mencius' reflections on automatic reactions can help to 
clarify Aquinas' accounts of intelligent dispositions, habits, tendencies, and 
invariant reactions. This means of analysis therefore serves to clarify the 
thought of two very different moral theorists, to bring to light unexpected 
similarities between them, and to aid us in our own efforts to think through 
the issues that they raise. 
It is unfortunate that a book of this sort, which crosses so many disciplinary 
lines, will probably be neglected by many "pure" scholars in the fields of 
moral philosophy, religious ethics, and the history of moral thought. YearJey 
has written what is one of the most significant books in recent years in all of 
these areas. His approach will of course be controversial, not least because 
he contends that the moral thought of at least some religious thinkers can be 
understood apart from their religious theories, to some degree at least. But 
the questions that his book raises are a mark of the cogency and importance 
of his arguments. His treatments of Mencius and Aquinas are always illumi-
nating, and while 1 did not agree with his interpretations of Aquinas at every 
point, his treatment of Aquinas' theory of the virtues is by far the best that I have 
ever seen. (I am not competent to evaluate his interpretation of Mencius.) Even 
more importantly, he has managed to offer a method for the comparative study 
of religious ethics that is at least prima facie plausible, and whether it is 
finally judged to be successful or not, that in itself is a rare and important 
achievement. No serious scholar of moral thought in any of its forms can 
afford to neglect this seminal book. 
Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philo-
sophical Theology, edited by Scott MacDvnald. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1991. Pp. ix and 328. $43.95 (cloth)/$14.95 (paper). 
Reviewed by DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame. 
As the title suggests, this collection testifies to the renewed interest in medi-
eval philosophical theology. The subtitle is also suggestive, reminding us that 
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'good,' like 'being,' is a transcendental, and so can enjoy the pervasive meta-
physical status evidenced in Plato as well as span "the distinction" between 
creator and creatures introduced by biblical and Qur'anic perspectives. More-
over, as we shall see, the most illuminating essays will exploit the difference 
as well as the connection which "the distinction" entails, displaying how 
metaphysically fruitful the doctrine of creation can be. Indeed, I shall argue 
that creation is the hidden thread weaving these disparate essays into a plau-
sible narrative, and bridging the gap which the editor dramatizes between two 
approaches to the metaphysics of goodness, focussing on participation or on 
nature, respectively. In his introductory essay, as well as the chapter devoted 
to Albert on transcendentals, MacDonald makes heavy weather of the differ-
ence between the two strategies, even while acknowledging "Aquinas' strug-
gle to reconcile [them] in his highly original conception of the divine nature 
and of God's relation to creation" (6). Yet one suspects Aquinas' originality 
to rest with his formulation more than his intent: that is, to express a shared 
faith in creation as utterly free yet best imaged by a pattern of emanation 
itself suggestive of participation. Natures, in other words, were understood 
by medievals to be created natures, and thereby display in their operations a 
being and a goodness participated from the one creator. That overarching 
perspective would have saved MacDonald an extrinsic reading of Albert, and 
allowed him to present his alternative reading first: that "good adds no reality 
in the sense that the properties in virtue of which it holds are not properties 
additional to those in virtue of which the thing is a being" (54). A perspecti ve 
of creation would have suggested that reading well before Aquinas' original 
formulation of such matters. 
Ralph Mcinerny and Jan Aertsen offer complementary exegeses of 
Aquinas' transformation of Boethius' De hebdomadibus, whence one could 
derive a conception of goodness as extrinsic to created natures, which would 
themselves be denominated good only by virtue of participating in divine 
goodness. Aquinas is the manifest hero of this drama, both metaphysically 
(Aertsen) "by means of the notion of 'act'" (65), and semantically (McInerny) 
by his insistence "that there are two rationes propriae of 'good' according to 
one of which it is first said of creatures and according to the other first said 
of God" (96). Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann then expound "the 
unusual ethical naturalism that underlies all of [Aquinas'] moral philosophy" 
(98), with some fruitful suggestions how such an identification of goodness 
with being can ground ethics in a way which supplies a viable alternative to 
"divine command" theories. Their naturalistic reading asserts that "Aquinas 
would say in general that an object a has goodness (to any extent) as an A if 
and only if a has the property of having actualized its specifying potentiality 
(to that extent)" (105-6). What one misses in such a formulation is the agency 
of a creator bestowing esse, such that any a qua A would be so far forth good, 
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for the "actualization of the thing's specifying potentiality" can hardly reflect 
an activity of the thing itself. They feel that their strategy requires such an 
Aristotelian reading, however, as they wish to present the inherent connection 
between being and goodness as an alternative foundation for ethical discrim-
inations, some of which they proceed to sketch out in broad strokes. 
Mark Jordan offers a careful and illuminating rendition of Aquinas on "the 
transcendentality of goodness and the human will" (129). After delineating 
the various senses of appetitus, and the reciprocal causality of the will (as 
"rational appetite") with the intellect, he scrutinizes de Malo 6, where 
"Thomas says quite clearly that the will can refuse to think actually [actu] 
about the highest good" (148). Jordan does not read this capacity for refusal 
as introducing "a radically new notion of experienced freedom or [asserting] 
a false distinctness in the experience of reciprocity" -notions associated with 
a Scotistic view of freedom, but rather links this possibility with "the limits 
of the conditions of the present life" (149). Acting on its own cannot be taken 
to be paradigmatic for the exercise of free will in Aquinas. Jorge Gracia 
focuses on Suarez' distinction of good/evil in itself, and good/evil for another, 
and shows how Suarez' attempt to parse "in itself' by means of "for another" 
fails to yield a transcendental notion of goodness. So we have an object lesson 
that the "doctrine of the transcendentality of goodness" cannot be sustained 
in the face of the "clear advantages of a strongly relational understanding of 
good and evil" (176). The lesson would be more cogent if readers had been 
apprised of those advantages (in this context) as well as had been invited to 
a more penetrating analysis of the "traditional scholastic understanding of 
evil as privation" (159). 
Eleonore Stump's reflections on faith and goodness introduce the section 
of philosophical theology. Her subject is the role of wilI in effecting the assent 
of faith, a role which becomes problematic on her reading of Aquinas that 
"the object of faith, considered from the point of view of human knowers, is 
not God but propositions about him" (187, citing ST 1-2.1.2). Yet she goes 
on to resolve the problems such a presumption elicits by calling attention to 
"what he thinks the point of faith is" (203): what is "made manifest through 
the propositions of faith is the goodness of God" (205), which thereby draws 
the will to assent to propositions whose truth is not manifest. So reasoning 
about such things "may clear away some intellectual obstacles that bar the 
believer's way to faith, [but] assent to the propositions of faith is initially 
produced by the will's hungering for God's goodness and moving the intellect 
in consequence" (207). Indeed; so fixing the point of the activity ought to 
modify one's initial perception of the object: propositions would then become 
that through which God is believed. 
In two consecutive essays, Norman Kretzmann continues to explore an 
issue which he had broached in 1983: why would God create anything at all? 
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(ch. 8), and why would God create this world? (ch. 9). The questions are 
related, since one might expect an account of the first, should one be avail-
able, to shed some light on the second. But what reasons might we adduce 
to answer the first question? Kretzmann reads the medieval controversy be-
tween necessary emanation and free creation of the universe as turning on 
whether God has any choice about the matter, where the "libertarian expla-
nation mayor may not go on to say why God freely chooses to create" (208), 
calling that fork which eschews any reasons at all "voluntarist, God willed 
it" (210). Kretzmann finds Aquinas suspended between "two opposing forces: 
Platonist self-diffusiveness and Aristotelian self-sufficiency" (222), and so 
,;onstrained to attenuate pseudo-Dionysius' principle that "good by its very 
JI1ature diffuses itself" to something which befits God, lest creating be a 
natural consequence of God's very goodness. Yet he recognizes that Aquinas' 
account of freedom is richer than a libertarian's focus on choosing, so that 
God's willing God's own goodness "can be both necessitated and volitional" 
(215), in which case God's "decision" to create a universe would amount to 
God's freely accepting the intrinsic orientation of the divine nature "calling 
for extrinsic, volitional diffusion, or creation" (220). In that case, of course, 
God would have no choice about the matter, yet the overflow of goodness 
would be at once spontaneous and free. With free creatures, such an account 
poses no difficulty (as Jordan reminded us), since a creature's orientation to 
"the good" is just that, when the free creature enters into the dynamic of 
willing inscribed in its created nature. Yet as a creature, this spontaneous 
orientation to "the good" is to its proper fulfillment, which is precisely what 
cannot be said about God. So God's free acquiescence in the overflow proper 
to goodness would differ from that "necessity of natural order, which is not 
incompatible with freedom" (223) which Aquinas associates with creatures, 
in carrying no hint of need, as though creation were required to complete 
divinity. It is here that Aquinas brings the revelation of God's triunity to bear 
(as Kretzmann acknowledges without pursuing): "when we say that in God 
there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not 
because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on 
account of the love of His own goodness" (ST 1.32.1.3), where the redupli-
cative "love of" lifts the activity to the intentional level of free gift. To see 
how Aquinas' explicit treatment moves the issue to an intentional (or per-
sonal) idiom is to render Kretzmann's concluding exposition of Bonaventure 
interesting yet redundant as a complement to the fuller picture of Aquinas. It 
also allows one to read the drama of redemption as an invitation to free 
creatures to participate in that eternally triune mutuality of love as completing 
the initial gift of creation. By explicitly patterning creation on the inner 
generation of the Word, Aquinas intends to "exclude the error of those who 
say that God produced things of necessity" (ST 1.32.1.3) and so underscore 
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that all is gift. And since full participation in that life of God would be 
"impossible without freedom on both sides of the relationship" (244), this 
world will embody the vagaries of free creatures, and hence evil. (The rest 
of Kretzmann's treatment of the second question is intriguing, but cannot be 
construed as parsing Aquinas, since it is based on his own resolution of what 
he took to be Aquinas' irresolution regarding the first question, as well as a 
characterization of God's existing necessarily-"that is, in every possible 
world" (236)-which ill-fits Aquinas' formula: the one whose essence is 
to-exist.) 
William Mann's essay on "the best of all possible worlds" offers a model 
of conceptual clarification of the ancillary notions and positions surrounding 
this vexing phrase: a rationalism (exemplified in Leibniz) which must both 
be able to order "possible worlds ... in terms of values" (260) and explain 
divine willing as optimal, and a voluntarism which "sees a desert landscape 
of equally valueless worlds in the absence of God's will" (268). Mann sets 
out to undermine the first presumption of rationalists by sketching two utterly 
incommensurable worlds: Teresa as opera singer or hospice worker. His anal-
ysis of the example makes clear that "best" can only operate within parame-
ters perceived or decided upon, and that God need not be thought of in either 
way regarding creation. What is wrong with the terms of the debate, as Mann 
sees it, is that "God's will and God's ·reason are conceived of as separate 
faculties or modules of the divine mind" (273). Aquinas' insistence on God's 
simplicity undermines the pictures which dominate the debate on either side, 
and also allows us to see how necessary truths, like '2 +2=4' are "part of the 
expressive content of a perfectly wise will" (275). Aquinas is invoked to 
mediate a seventeenth-century debate, in a way which helps to clarify the 
terms of that debate, and so dissolve rather than resolve the question. It does 
not seem that divine simpleness by itself will do all the work Mann wants it 
to do, but his essay offers fruitful leads for those who would explore this 
strategy. 
Thomas Morris' essay stands in tension with the opening chapters on the 
"transcendentality of goodness," since he thumps for the fruitfulness of a 
theology centered on "the conception of God as the greatest possible, or 
maximally perfect being, an individual who has the greatest possible array 
of properties it is intrinsically good to have" (278), presuming the notion of 
"maximal perfection" (280) to be coherent and meaningful. He then proceeds 
to demonstrate that such a One corresponds to the One which creation-the-
ology identifies as "the singular font of all existence" (281), using generally 
accepted theorems regarding causality. Yet we remain unclear why the "max-
imally perfect being" would also be the origin of all-that-is; only that some-
one who held both perspectives would be able to assert their identity, in virtue 
of the "tight connections" (285) between the two approaches to God. Yet 
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since those connections admit of no primacy, mere preference dictates Morris' 
conclusion that "the best philosophical theology may yet be one that both 
explains being with an eye on creation and navigates its conceptual way by 
the coordinates of goodness, absolutely perfect goodness" (297). One might 
ctlternatively insist that nothing but a creation perspective could make sense 
of "absolutely perfect goodness," so that "perfect being" theology would be 
parasitic upon a metaphysics which made creation central, since the "coor-
dinates of goodness" transcend any categoriallimits, and hence would not be 
available to us in the ways in which Morris pretends-something which the 
rarified abstractness of the argumentation already suggests. And such a crit-
icism would render his resumed argument with William Mann on divine 
simpleness otiose as weIl, since the source-of-aIl could never be said to 
exemplify "any metaphysicaIly distinct property" (288), but only to be its 
source. The subtle relations between being and goodness, explored through-
out this exemplary coIlection, could bring some useful sophistication to these 
recondite matters. 
